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Abstract
The UEFA Champions League is the major European club football competition
organised by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). It contains 32
teams, consequently, the national champions of most UEFA associations have to
play in the qualification to receive a slot in the group stage. The paper evaluates
the impact of reforming the Champions Path of the qualifying system, effective from
the 2018/19 season. While it is anticipated that the reduction in the number of
berths decreases the probability of advancing to the group stage, the distribution of
the losses among the national associations can only be estimated via Monte-Carlo
simulations. In contrast to similar works, our methodology considers five seasons
instead of one to filter out any possible season-specific attributes. Almost all of
the 45 countries are found to gain less prize money on average. Several champions,
including the Cypriot, the Swiss, and the Scottish, might face a loss of over one
million Euros. Since the negative effects depend to a large extent on the somewhat
arbitrary differences between the positions of the access list, we propose to introduce
more randomness into the allocation of qualifying slots.
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1 Introduction
Since the success of a tournament highly depends on its design (Szymanski, 2003), several
championships have been subject to rule changes to their structure. The evaluation of
similar reforms is an important topic of operations research (Wright, 2009, 2014; Kendall
and Lenten, 2017).
The UEFA Champions League, commonly known as the Champions League, is the
most prestigious annual club football competition in Europe, organised by the Union of
European Football Associations (UEFA). While its predecessor, the European Champion
Clubs’ Cup, was a standard knockout tournament contested exclusively by the champions
of national leagues in the previous year, the rebranding of the competition in the 1992/93
season has added a round-robin group stage and has provided slots to more teams from
the strongest national leagues.
This paper aims to analyse the impact of a change in the Champions League qualifica-
tion, effective from 2018, on the champions of the lower-ranked UEFA member associations.
These clubs should compete in the Champions Path of the qualification to reach the
lucrative group stage of the Champions League. The qualification is basically a knockout
tournament currently consisting of five rounds, where each team enters the stage determ-
ined by the rank of its national association. The official access list for the 2019/20 UEFA
Champions League can be found in UEFA (2019b, Annex A). Each round is drawn such
that the teams are divided into the seeded and unseeded pots of equal size based on their
UEFA club coefficients at the beginning of the season, and a seeded team is matched
against an unseeded team.
In particular, we attempt (1) to quantify the probability of qualification for the
Champions League under the old and the new qualifying systems; and (2) to explore the
role of seeding in the current qualifying system. Since the actual real-world results represent
only some realisations of several random variables, the ex-ante expected probabilities are
calculated through Monte-Carlo simulations.
Our paper offers the first statistical evaluation of the Champions League qualification.
Compared to similar research focusing on the Champions League (Corona et al., 2019;
Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019), we are forced to use a simpler approach as the qualification
involves several teams from small UEFA associations, which play few matches outside their
domestic league in a season. Nonetheless, while some precaution is needed in interpreting
the numerical results, the qualitative implications of the reform will turn out to be robust.
The current work has also a methodological contribution since the previous simulations
of the UEFA Champions League (Scarf et al., 2009; Corona et al., 2019; Dagaev and
Rudyak, 2019) have considered only one season. However, since the set of particular clubs
varies from season to season, these results may have some limitations due to the possible
season-specific attributes. Therefore, we take into account the five seasons from 2015/16
to 2019/20 to reliably estimate the true effects of the reform. The five-year span is picked
because of the UEFA club coefficient, underlying the seeding in UEFA club tournaments,
sums the points earned over the previous five seasons with equal weights.
In particular, each simulation run is based on the access list of a season drawn randomly,
allowing for weighting toward the recent seasons. Analogously, the characteristics of the
champions are chosen independently from the last five seasons in order to filter out biases
caused by the unexpected performance of a club. For instance, it would be misleading
to represent the average English champion by the unexpected 2015/16 winner Leicester
City: the club was 5000-1 with bookmakers to win the league before the season started,
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and its performance was described as the “most unlikely triumph in the history of team
sport” (BBC, 2016). Hopefully, this convenient proposal could become a standard for
future analyses.
The significance of this study is twofold. Firstly, even though the qualification matches
attract less media attention than later clashes, and the teams considered here often only
“make up the numbers” in the Champions League, qualification for the group stage of
the Champions League generate considerable local interest as it remains a significant
achievement for the majority of the 54 national champions in Europe. For example,
Hungarian teams participated only two times in the group stage of the Champions League,
Ferencva´ros in the 1995/96, and Debrecen in the 2009/10 season. For these clubs, this
gives practically the only opportunity to face the leading European clubs.
Secondly, the Champions League means a crucial source of revenue for teams from
minor leagues even if they have a low probability to win matches in the group stage. The
Swedish champion Helsingborg qualified for the Champions League in the 2000/01 season,
which pushed its annual revenue by 80% compared to the previous and subsequent years
(Menary, 2016). Similarly, although the Hungarian champion Debrecen was eliminated
from the 2009/10 Champions League after losing all of the group games, this brought in 9
million Euros, while the total revenue in 2011 was only 3.4 million Euros (Menary, 2016).
Table 1: 2019/20 UEFA Champions League revenue distribution system
Achievement Prize money (million Euros)
Preliminary round (PR) 0.23
First qualifying round (Q1) 0.28
Second qualifying round (Q2) 0.38
Third qualifying round (Q3) 0.48
Play-off (PO) 5
Group stage (GS) 15.25
Group stage win bonus 2.7
Group stage draw bonus 0.9
Round of 16 qualification 9.5
The table contains only the starting fee and the performance-related fixed amounts,
without the bonuses for qualification to the quarterfinals, semifinals, and final, as
well as for winning the tournament. The market pool distributed in accordance with
the proportional value of each TV market is not included.
Source: UEFA (2019a)
Table 1 illustrates how lucrative the UEFA Champions League group stage can be.
Although the clubs eliminated in the play-off round of the Champions League qualification
automatically go to the second-tier competition UEFA Europe League with a starting fee
of 2.92 million Euros, participation in the Champions League group stage yields 10 million
Euros in additional revenue according to a conservative “back of the envelope” calculation.
The reader should keep in mind throughout the paper that each percentage point change
in the probability of qualification for the UEFA Champions League is equivalent to
approximately 100 thousand Euros.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of
connected papers. Section 3 presents the qualifying system of the Champions League.
The simulation model is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 illuminates our findings, and
Section 6 summarises them.
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2 Related literature
The UEFA Champions League has been the subject of a large number of academic works.
According to Page and Page (2007), playing the second leg at home in the knockout phase
of European cups, including the Champions League, means a significant—albeit somewhat
declining—advantage. This finding has been reinforced in Geenens and Cuddihy (2018)
but has been questioned recently by Amez et al. (2020). Eugster et al. (2011) conclude
that the observed difference can be attributed to the performance in the group stage and
the teams’ general strength.
Scarf et al. (2009) estimate various tournament metrics for several possible designs of
the Champions League. The procedure used by the UEFA for the Round of 16 draw is found
to result in strange probabilities for certain pairings (Klo¨ßner and Becker, 2013). Boczon´
and Wilson (2018) aim to understand and analyse the mechanism used for the Round of
16 draw with the tools of market design. While match outcomes in the lower rounds of the
Champions League are less uncertain compared to its predecessor European Champion
Clubs’ Cup, the competitive balance has increased at the later stages (Schokkaert and
Swinnen, 2016). Dagaev and Rudyak (2019) examine the competitiveness changes in
the UEFA Champions League and Europa League implied by reforming the group stage
seeding in the Champions League from the 2015/16 season. Corona et al. (2019) evaluate
these two seeding regimes by taking into account the uncertainty of parameter estimates
in a Bayesian framework. Csato´ (2020c) analyses the effect of the seeding reform from a
theoretical point of view. Guyon (2019) proposes a new knockout format for the Champions
League through the policy of “choose your opponent”.
However, less research is devoted to studying the UEFA Champions League qualification.
According to Green et al. (2015), an increase in the number of Champions League slots for
a national league implies higher investment in talent, especially among the clubs that just
failed to qualify in the previous season. The prize money distributed by the UEFA for
participation in the Champions League is found to threaten with a hegemony emerging in
smaller European leagues (Menary, 2016). Finally, Csato´ (2019b) investigates the incentive
compatibility in the Champions League entry.
Our article is also strongly connected to the studies comparing different real-world
tournament designs due to its methodology. Besides the already mentioned papers focusing
on the UEFA Champions League (Scarf et al., 2009; Corona et al., 2019; Dagaev and
Rudyak, 2019), Goossens et al. (2012) evaluate four formats that have been considered
by the Royal Belgian Football Association with respect to the importance of the games.
Lasek and Gagolewski (2018) analyse the efficacy of the tournament formats used in the
majority of European top-tier association football competitions, Csato´ (2019a) compares
the designs of recent World Men’s Handball Championships, while Csato´ (2020b) challenges
the paradigm of balanced groups in hybrid tournaments consisting of a round-robin group
stage followed by the knockout phase.
3 The qualifying system of the Champions League
The slots in the UEFA Champions League are allocated based on the ranking of UEFA
member associations according to their UEFA coefficients, which are determined by the
performances of the corresponding clubs during the previous five seasons of the Champions
League and the UEFA Europa League. Dagaev and Rudyak (2019, Appendix A.1) provide
the details of its calculation. Higher-ranked associations are entitled to more places in
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the group stage and/or their teams have to contest fewer qualification rounds, the only
exception being that certain positions are not distinguished in the access list. For example,
the champions of the 14th and 15th associations alike enter the third qualifying round in
the current system.
Teams without a guaranteed slot in the Champions League participate in its qualification
tournament that is divided into two separate paths since the 2009/10 season: the Champions
Path for the champions of lower-ranked national associations, and the League Path
contested by the teams that did not win their higher-ranked domestic leagues.1
There is another way to obtain a berth in the group stage. The English Premier League
received four places in the 2005/06 season, however, the winner of the 2004/05 Champions
League, Liverpool, finished only fifth in the championship. Therefore, UEFA made a one-off
exception by allowing the team to defend its title and amended the qualification criteria
such that the Champions League titleholder has a slot in the next season. Analogously,
the winner of the UEFA Europa League from the previous season entered the play-off
round of the League Path in the three seasons played between 2015 and 2018, while it
directly qualifies for the group stage of the Champions League since the 2018/19 season.
Both policies can create a vacant slot somewhere in the qualifying system if a titleholder
also qualifies from its domestic championship. Filling the vacancy is a nontrivial task
since it may lead to incentive incompatibility (Dagaev and Sonin, 2018), for instance,
in the Champions League between 2015 and 2018 (Csato´, 2019b). The exact rules are
described in UEFA (2017, Article 3) for the 2017/18 and UEFA (2018, Article 3) for the
2018/19 seasons. For the sake of simplicity, the Champions League titleholder is assumed
to qualify for the group stage through its domestic championship in all our simulations.2
Because a vacancy created in the group stage by the Europa League titleholder was filled
via rebalancing the League Path, it is enough to exclude the case that this team is the
champion of a national association ranked 12th or lower, which seems reasonable, too.
The number of UEFA member associations competing in the Champions League is
fixed at 55 only from the 2017/18 season when the champion of Kosovo joined.
The Champions League qualification is regulated in three-year cycles since 2012,
namely, the access list that allocates the slots available for a given rank among the national
associations is unchanged for three seasons (2012-15, 2015-18, 2018-21). On the other
hand, the actual ranking is updated every year. For example, the 11th association was the
Czech Republic in the 2018/19 and Austria in the 2019/20 season, thus Viktoria Plzenˇ
and Salzburg directly entered the group stage in these seasons, respectively.
The access list has seen a substantial modification between the 2015-18 and 2018-21
cycles. The impact of this change on the Champions Path, that is, on the probability of
qualification for the champions of lower-ranked leagues, will be evaluated in this paper.
Table 2 summarises the two variants to be compared via Monte-Carlo simulations: the
old (pre-2018, Table 2.a) and the new (post-2018, Table 2.b) regimes in the Champions
Path of the Champions League qualification.3
1 Before this separation, a champion may meet with a strong team coming from a leading association.
For instance, FC Barcelona (the third team in Spain) played against Wis la Krako´w (the champion in
Poland) in the third qualifying round of the 2008/09 season.
2 There were two exceptions after the case of Liverpool in 2005: AC Milan would have qualified
only for the third qualifying round of the 2007/08 Champions League as being the fourth team in Italy,
while Chelsea failed to qualify for the 2012/13 Champions League as being the sixth team in the 2011/12
Premier League.
3 The 2019/20 Champions League titleholder, Bayern Munich, qualified for the 2020/21 Champions
League group stage via its domestic league. However, due to schedule delays in both the 2019/20 and
5
Table 2: The UEFA Champions League qualification for the champions
(a) 2017/18 season
Qualifying round Number of teams Teams entering in this
round
Teams advancing from
the previous round
First (Q1) 10 10 champions from
associations 46–55
—
Second (Q2) 34 29 champions from
associations 16–45
(except Liechtenstein)
5 winners from Q1
Third (Q3) 20 3 champions from
associations 13–15
17 winners from Q2
Play-off (PO) 10 — 10 winners from Q3
Group stage 17 12 champions from
associations 1–12
5 winners from PO
(b) 2018/19, 2019/20, and 2020/21 seasons
Qualifying round Number of teams Teams entering in this
round
Teams advancing from
the previous round
Preliminary (PR) 4 4 champions from
associations 52–55
—
First (Q1) 32 31 champions from
associations 20–51
(except Liechtenstein)
1 winner from PR
Second (Q2) 20 4 champions from
associations 16–19
16 winners from Q1
Third (Q3) 12 2 champions from
associations 14–15
10 winners from Q2
Play-off (PO) 8 2 champions from
associations 12–13
6 winners from Q3
Group stage 15 11 champions from
associations 1–11
4 winners from PO
The preliminary round (PR), launched in the 2018/19 season, is played as two one-
legged semi-finals and a final hosted by one of the four competing clubs drawn randomly.
In the qualifying rounds Q1–Q3 and in the play-off round (PO), teams play two-legged
home-and-away matches.
2020/21 seasons caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020/21 season started before the conclusion of
the 2019/20 season. Hence the access list modifications could not be certain until the earlier qualifying
rounds had been played and/or their draws had been made. UEFA used “adaptive re-balancing” to
change the access list once the berths for the Champions League and Europa League title holders were
determined such that the competition rounds of the qualifying phase that have already been drawn or
played at the moment the titleholders are determined will not be impacted (UEFA, 2020, Article 3.04).
Therefore, 33 champions from associations 18–51 (except Liechtenstein) entered the first qualifying round
(Q1), 3 champions from associations 15–17 entered the second qualifying round (Q2), and 3 champions
from associations 12–14 entered the play-off round (PO). Thus the schedule delay favoured association 14
(Greece) at the expense of associations 15 (Croatia), 18 (Cyprus), and 19 (Serbia) compared to Table 2.b.
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In all rounds, the clubs are separated into seeded and unseeded pots containing the
same number of teams based on their UEFA club coefficients at the beginning of the season,
which quantifies their performance in the last five seasons of the UEFA Champions League
and Europa League. Dagaev and Rudyak (2019, Appendix A.2) details the computation
of the UEFA club coefficient. A seeded team is always drawn against an unseeded team.
Although the UEFA club coefficients of the teams are fixed during the whole qualifica-
tion, the winners of the previous round are usually not known at the time of the draws,
hence the club with the higher coefficient is assumed to advance. In other words, if an
unseeded team qualifies for the next round, it effectively carries over the coefficient of its
opponent to the next round but not further.
However, the play-off round of the pre-2018 system was drawn after the third qualifying
round had finished, thus the coefficients of the participating teams could have been used
directly. We have decided to disregard this minor difference in the simulations because it
is connected to the match calendar, not to the format of the qualification.
As an illustration, consider the case of the Hungarian champion Ferencva´ros in the
2019/20 UEFA Champions League qualification. Since Hungary was the 29th association,
the club entered the first qualifying round (Q1). Its coefficient was 3.5, a rather low value.
Ferencva´ros managed to reach the third qualifying round as follows:
∙ Q1: it was unseeded, and played against the seeded Ludogorets Razgrad from
Bulgaria, which also entered Q1 with a coefficient of 27, one of the highest at this
stage. Ferencva´ros advanced to Q2.
∙ Q2: it was considered with a coefficient of 27, was seeded, and played against
Valletta from Malta, which was considered with a coefficient of 6.25 due to its
advance against Dudelange from Luxembourg in Q1 (the real coefficient of Valletta
was 4.25). Ferencva´ros advanced to Q3.
∙ Q3: it was considered with a coefficient of 4.25, was unseeded, and played
against Dinamo Zagreb from Croatia (coefficient: 29.5), which entered Q2 and
advanced against Saburtalo Tbilisi from Georgia (coefficient: 0.95). Ferencva´ros
was eliminated.
4 Methodology
The aims of the study, outlined in the Introduction, will be achieved by quantifying the
probability of qualification for the UEFA Champions League group stage via Monte-Carlo
simulations. The two qualifying systems are known from Section 3, thus they can be
simulated repeatedly if we have a prediction model for the outcome of the matches.
For this purpose, the strengths of the teams are estimated by the Club Elo ratings,
available at http://clubelo.com/.4 The Elo rating is based on past results such that
the same result against a stronger opponent has more value and the influence of a game
decreases after new games are played (Van Eetvelde and Ley, 2019). While there exists
no single nor any official Elo rating for football clubs, Elo-inspired methods seem to
outperform other measures with respect to forecasting power (Lasek et al., 2013). They
4 There is a parallel project at http://elofootball.com/, which also measures the strength of
European clubs by the Elo method. However, its methodology remains more opaque, and historical data
cannot be obtained straightforwardly.
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have also been widely used in the academic literature (Hvattum and Arntzen, 2010; Lasek
et al., 2016; Cea et al., 2020; Csato´, 2020a).
The Elo ratings of http://clubelo.com/ modify the standard Elo system by taking
home advantage and goal difference into account. Furthermore, in two-legged matches,
which are played in the Champions League qualification except for the preliminary round
(launched in the 2018/19 season), the clubs are not necessarily interested in winning one
match and perhaps losing the other, but they focus primarily on advancing to the next
round. Therefore, the aggregated result over the two legs determines the total number of
exchanged points, multiplied by the square root of 2 compared to a single game. Because
the number of away goals scored is the tie-breaking rule if the aggregated scores are level,
advancing due to away goals counts as a win by a half goal margin.
The underlying database contains all international matches played in the UEFA
Champions League and the UEFA Europa League, as well as in their predecessors (see
http://clubelo.com/Data). Domestic league results are considered in the higher-ranked
associations written in bold in Table A.3, and the second division of the five strongest
associations (Spain, England, Italy, Germany, France) are also included. Therefore, the
ratings of teams from lower-ranked associations are calculated only from relatively few
international matches and could be more uncertain. However, the benefit from extending
the dataset with many games involving clubs whose Elo is pure speculation remains
questionable. Furthermore, as we will see, these teams have no reasonable chance to
participate in the Champions League. Consequently, changing the design of the qualification
does not affect their odds substantially in absolute terms.
According to the methodology of the Club Elo rating (see http://clubelo.com/
System), the a priori probability that team 𝑖 with an Elo of 𝐸𝑖 advances against team 𝑗
with an Elo of 𝐸𝑗 is given by
𝑊𝑒 =
1
1 + 10−𝑑/𝑠 (1)
in the one-legged matches of the preliminary round PR, and by
𝑊 *𝑒 =
1
1 + 10−
√
2𝑑/𝑠
(2)
in the two-legged home-and-away clashes of qualifying rounds Q1–Q3 and PO, where
𝑑 = 𝐸𝑖 − 𝐸𝑗 is the difference between the Elo ratings of the two teams, and 𝑠 is a scaling
parameter. 𝑠 = 400 is used in the calculation of Club Elo rating.
The ranking of the national associations somewhat fluctuates across seasons. Analog-
ously, the champion of an association has a different UEFA club coefficient and strength
in each season. While Elo ratings are dynamic, the underlying strengths of the teams are
assumed to remain static during the whole Champions League qualification (played over
approximately two months between the end of June and the end of August) because the
UEFA club coefficients are also fixed in a given season. In particular, we have decided to
use the Elo ratings from 1 September because it still reflects the performance of the team
during the qualification. Note that our main aim is to correctly forecast the effects of the
reform, hence it is not necessary to use exclusively ex-ante information for prediction.
The analysis is based on the last five seasons from 2015/16 to 2019/20. A simulation
run consists of the following steps:
1. A season is drawn randomly to determine the underlying ranking of the national
associations. The five possibilities are given in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
For example, if the season 2018/19 is drawn, then Austria is the 15th, hence
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its champion enters the third qualifying round (Q3) in both the pre-2018 and
post-2018 regimes according to Table 2. Similarly, Poland is the 20th, thus its
champion enters the second qualifying round (Q2) in the pre-2018 format and the
first qualifying round (Q1) in the post-2018 format.
2. The characteristics of the champion of any UEFA member association is drawn
randomly from the five seasons.5 The UEFA club coefficients of the champions
are shown in Table A.2, while their Elo points are presented in Table A.3 in
the Appendix. The two measures are not drawn independently for a particular
association to preserve their coherence but they are drawn independently for each
association. For instance, if the attributes of both the Austrian and the Polish
champions are drawn from the season 2015/16, then their UEFA club coefficients
are 43.145 and 17.3, respectively. Since the two draws are independent, this
scenario occurs with probability 1/25.
3. 43 competitors, the champions of the associations ranked 12–55 without Liecht-
enstein, play in the qualification. Therefore, a 43× 43 binary matrix of match
outcomes is generated randomly for all possible pairs of clubs based on the for-
mula (2). This matrix is plugged into both qualifying systems to record the set
of the six and four qualified teams, respectively.6 The champions of the associ-
ations ranked not lower than the 11th are added to the set of qualified teams.
For example, Turkey is at most the 11th association in four seasons, therefore
its champion has an 80% chance to automatically qualify for the group stage.
Furthermore, since the country was ranked 12th even in the 2016/17 season, its
champion always qualifies in the pre-2018 system. However, this is not guaranteed
under the post-2018 regime, when this club should play in the play-off round (PO)
of the Champions League qualification.
While the implementation of the last point contains no novelty, the first two parts have
some value added to the modelling technique: both Corona et al. (2019) and Dagaev and
Rudyak (2019) simulate only one particular season, although the authors of the former
work have repeated the exercise for another season without reporting the results in the
paper.
The simulations have been carried out for various number of independent runs. Figure 1
shows the average Elo rating of the teams qualified for the group stage of the Champions
League as the function of the number of iterations. Therefore, every simulation has been
run one million (106) times when both measures have already stabilised.
5 Results
Now we turn to evaluate the effects of changing the qualifying system of the Champions
League in 2018 on the UEFA member associations.
Figure 2 highlights the impact on the probability of reaching the group stage. The novel
design is detrimental to all the 45 national associations. The biggest loser is Switzerland
5 The champion of Kosovo has participated first in the 2017/18 Champions League qualification.
Therefore, Kosovo is assumed to be ranked 55th in the previous two seasons, and the ratings of its
champion are drawn randomly from the last three seasons.
6 The reform in 2018 introduced the preliminary round, where the probability of advancing should be
computed according to formula (1).
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Figure 1: The dependence of the average Elo rating of the teams that
qualified for the UEFA Champions League on the number of iterations
104 105 106
1609
1609.5
1610
1610.5
Number of independent runs
1628
1628.1
1628.2
Old (pre-2018) format (left scale) New (post-2018) format (right scale)
as it has been ranked 12th in the three seasons since 2017: this association should give
up its guaranteed place in the Champions League group stage due to the reform. Cyprus
and Scotland considerably suffer from the new regime, too, because their champions are
usually relatively strong in the qualification, and they should play one more round now.
However, the effect on the Czech Republic is almost neutral since it was the 13th in two
seasons, and the reform favours this champion by decreasing the number of rounds to be
played from two to one (see Table 2). The reduction in the probability of qualification is
over 10 percentage points—exceeding 1 million Euros in expected prize money—for eight
national associations.
In relative terms, the loss in the probability of qualification remains below 25% only
for the six strongest associations in the sample, although a na¨ıve guess on the basis of
Table 2 would suggest a reduction of 20% as the number of available berths is reduced
from five to four. Clearly, the reallocation of the entry positions has a significant effect
and the odds of several associations are more than halved. For example, the Hungarian
champion has about 2.65% chance to qualify for the Champions League according to the
old format, but it is only 1.07% in the current design. While increasing the number of
popular teams from the best national associations in the group stage will perhaps raise
the overall revenue and, consequently, the prize money available in the Champions League
in the long run, it is unlikely that its growth will balance such a dramatic reduction in the
probability of qualification.
Figure 3 shows the probability of qualification under both systems as the function
of the average Elo rating of the champions. While there is a clear positive trend, some
outliers can be identified. For instance, the Turkish club with an expected Elo of 1644.2
certainly qualifies in the old regime although it is only the fifth best team. Analogously,
the champion of Bulgaria (average Elo: 1500) has an advantage of 9.33 percentage points
over the champion of Norway (average Elo: 1510.8) in the probability of qualification
under the old (pre-2018) system, which is reduced to 2.97 percentage points in the new
(post-2018) system. The Dutch club is the strongest in our sample, which explains that its
odds are almost independent of the qualifying system used.
The new policy seems to reflect somewhat better the strength of the teams. However,
this is anticipated on the basis of Table 3: the literature of tournament design reinforces
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Figure 2: The difference in the probability of qualification (under the new system minus
under the old system) for the UEFA Champions League group stage—Unweighted seasons
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Figure 3: The probability of qualification for the UEFA Champions League group stage
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the intuition that the best teams can be selected more reliably if more matches are played
(Scarf et al., 2009; Lasek and Gagolewski, 2018; Csato´, 2019a).
A sensitivity analysis can be carried out by changing the scaling parameter in formu-
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Table 3: The number of clashes in the UEFA Champions League qualification
Qualifying round Old (pre-2018) system New (post-2018) system
Preliminary (PR) — 3
First (Q1) 5 16
Second (Q2) 17 10
Third (Q3) 10 6
Play-off (PO) 5 4
Total 37 39
las (1) and (2). The results obtained with the values 𝑠 = 600 and 𝑠 = 800, which increase
the competitive balance between the teams, are presented in Figure 4. The Czech Republic
and the Netherlands benefit from the reform when the differences between the champions
decrease but this is primarily caused by the smaller probability of qualification under the
old regime. Nonetheless, the overall impact remains robust with respect to this variable,
although the odds vary considerably: the Hungarian champion can enter the group stage
with the probability of 1.07% in the baseline case of 𝑠 = 400, which grows to 2.09% if
𝑠 = 600, and to 3.02% if 𝑠 = 800, while the corresponding probabilities under the old
qualifying system are 2.65%, 4.67%, and 6.32%, respectively.
Figure 5 focuses on the role of seeding in the current post-2018 design. It changes
the probability of qualification by at most 6 percentage points and usually favours the
best national associations of our dataset. The impact of seeding can also be remarkable
in relative terms, for example, the Scottish champion can qualify with a probability of
23.8%, which would decrease to 18.4% in the absence of seeding. Returning to the case of
Hungary, its average club would have a 2.13% chance to play in the Champions League if
UEFA would use a random draw in the qualifying, which almost doubles its baseline odds.
Again, probably the best illustration of the significance of seeding is offered by the
comparison of the Bulgarian and the Norwegian champions. These clubs have almost the
same expected Elo rating (1500 vs. 1510.8), resulting in the qualifying probabilities of
8.24% and 9.34%, respectively. However, the Bulgarian club had a better UEFA coefficient
in each of the five seasons, hence its actual probability of reaching the group stage is higher
with about 3 percentage points (10.06% vs. 7.09%)—in monetary terms, this translates to
300 thousand Euros per year on average. Even though the impact of seeding is smaller
compared to the effect of the 2018 reform, it has still a substantial influence on the
qualifying system.
The future effects of the reform primarily depend on the position of an association.
Therefore, it might be misleading to assume that the last five seasons are accurate predictors
because there are some remarkable trends even during this short period. According
to Table A.1, the national leagues in Austria and Croatia have become stronger (at
least, according to the measure of the UEFA), while the level of the Dutch and Greek
championships gradually declines. Consequently, it is worth studying what happens if the
access lists are weighted towards the present. We have chosen the probabilities 10%, 15%,
20%, 25%, and 30% for the seasons from 2015/16 to 2019/20. For example, it means that
the Turkish champion has to play in the qualification with a probability of 15% instead
of the unweighted 20% as this association was ranked lower than the 11th only in the
2016/17 season.
These calculations are reported in Figure 6. The pattern mainly follows the unweighted
13
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis with respect to competitive balance—The difference in the
probability of qualification (under the new system minus under the old system) for the
UEFA Champions League group stage
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Figure 5: The effect of seeding on the probability of qualification for the UEFA
Champions League group stage in percentage points, new (post-2018) format
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Figure 6: The difference in the probability of qualification (under the new system minus
under the old system) for the UEFA Champions League group stage—Weighted seasons
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case, however, the loss of Switzerland increases by about five percentage points. The
reason is that this association was ranked the 12th in the last three seasons, and the new
system forces its champion to play in the play-off round (PO) instead of providing a slot in
the group stage. Again, the Czech Republic seems to gain from the reform because it was
ranked 13th in the 2017/18 and the 2019/20 seasons. The weighting favours the Austrian
club, its probability of qualification increases from 64.5% to 68.9% under the new policy,
while the Dutch champion is found to be in a worse position (86.2% vs. 80.7%). With
this assumption, six associations (Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Scotland)
plus the already mentioned Switzerland lose more than 1 million Euros in expected prize
money.
6 Conclusions
We have studied how the new qualifying system of the UEFA Champions League, introduced
in the 2018/19 season, has changed the probability of participation in the group stage for
the champions of the 45 lowest-ranked UEFA associations. According to our simulations,
at most one country benefits from the reform. On the other hand, the champions of several
associations have lost more than one million Euros in expected prize money. The results
are robust with respect to competitive balance and the weighting of the access lists toward
the recent seasons. The seeding used by the UEFA in the draw of qualifying matches has
a moderated effect compared to the novel design.
Our numerical estimates are higher than the findings concerning the seeding regimes
in the Champions League group stage (Corona et al., 2019; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019),
which influence most tournament metrics only marginally. The reform considered here has
more important economic consequences than modifying the pots in the draw of the group
stage. However, it admittedly affects smaller and less prestigious European clubs.
The methodological novelty of the current paper resides in its multi-season perspective:
the true effects of a rule change can be identified only if the characteristics (strength,
UEFA club coefficients, etc.) of the contestants are good proxies to the expected values.
While the solution proposed to address this problem is straightforward, we hope it can
become a standard approach of similar investigations based on Monte-Carlo simulations.
Nonetheless, it should be recognised that the distribution of effects caused by the reform
largely depends on the somewhat arbitrary but sharp differences between some positions
of the access list. Perhaps UEFA can use a more random procedure to decide whether a
particular champion has to play one or two qualifying rounds. For instance, instead of
fixing that the club from the 13th association enters the play-off in the qualification and
the club from the 14th association enters the third qualifying round, the right of playing
one round less can be drawn randomly according to 60%-40%, or 70%-30% between the
two teams. This idea would lead to flatter odds, which would be fairer in our opinion.
To conclude, the UEFA has undeniably lifted the barriers to participation in the
Champions League for most European champions since the 2018/19 season. It is in stark
contrast to the recent reform of the seeding in the group stage, effective from 2016, that
has favoured the champions of the highest-ranked associations. Consequently, the UEFA
Champions League has become rather a playground of leading European associations, and
has moved farther from its original concept of being a “league of champions”. While the
goal of the amendments has been probably commercial or political, the results presented
above yield important insight into the possible effects of changing the qualifying system.
Therefore, our contribution can be valuable for all stakeholders, especially as UEFA plans
17
to make the Champions League even more distorted for the elite clubs (Panja, 2019).
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Appendix
Table A.1: The UEFA access list rank of the national associations in the last five seasons
Association 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
Turkey 11 12 11 10 10
Austria 14 16 16 15 11
Switzerland 13 11 12 12 12
Czech Republic 15 14 13 11 13
Netherlands 8 9 10 13 14
Greece 12 13 14 14 15
Croatia 20 17 17 16 16
Denmark 19 22 24 18 17
Israel 17 20 23 22 18
Cyprus 18 18 19 24 19
Romania 16 15 15 17 20
Poland 21 19 18 20 21
Sweden 24 24 21 21 22
Azerbaijan 32 29 26 26 23
Bulgaria 25 25 29 27 24
Serbia 27 27 27 28 25
Scotland 23 23 25 23 26
Belarus 22 21 20 19 27
Kazakhstan 34 32 28 29 28
Norway 26 26 22 25 29
Slovenia 29 28 30 30 30
Liechtenstein 46 38 32 32 31
Slovakia 30 30 31 31 32
Moldova 31 33 34 34 33
Albania 40 42 39 37 34
Iceland 37 36 35 35 35
Hungary 28 31 33 33 36
FYR Macedonia 42 39 40 42 37
Finland 36 35 37 36 38
Republic of Ireland 43 40 41 38 39
Bosnia and Herzegovina 35 37 38 39 40
Latvia 38 46 42 41 41
Estonia 50 48 47 43 42
Lithuania 41 45 45 48 43
Montenegro 39 41 44 44 44
Georgia 33 34 36 40 45
Armenia 49 51 48 45 46
Malta 45 47 50 49 47
Luxembourg 44 43 43 46 48
Northern Ireland 47 44 46 47 49
Wales 48 50 51 50 50
Faroe Islands 51 49 49 51 51
Gibraltar 54 54 52 52 52
Andorra 53 52 53 53 53
San Marino 52 53 54 54 54
Kosovo — — 55 55 55
Rank stands for the rank of the national association in the corresponding UEFA access list.
Liechtenstein does not organise a domestic league.
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Table A.2: The UEFA club coefficients of the champions in the last five seasons
Association 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
Turkey 50.02 34.92 45.84 29.5 22.5
Austria 43.135 42.52 40.57 55.5 54.5
Switzerland 84.875 87.755 74.415 20.5 27.5
Czech Republic 41.825 44.585 8.135 33 21.5
Netherlands 58.195 57.112 23.212 36 70.5
Greece 62.38 70.94 64.58 10 23.5
Croatia 24.7 25.775 15.55 17.5 29.5
Denmark 7.96 24.72 37.8 11.5 31
Israel 18.2 4.725 10.875 10 16
Cyprus 35.46 35.935 26.21 27 25.5
Romania 40.259 11.076 5.87 4.09 3.5
Poland 17.3 28 28.45 24.5 3.85
Sweden 12.545 3.975 16.945 14 5.5
Azerbaijan 11.5 13.475 18.05 20.5 22
Bulgaria 25.35 25.625 34.175 37 27
Serbia 14.775 7.175 16.075 10.75 16.75
Scotland 39.08 40.46 42.785 31 31
Belarus 35.15 34 29.475 20.5 27.5
Kazakhstan 3.825 12.575 16.8 21.75 27.5
Norway 10.375 12.85 12.665 9 11.5
Slovenia 22.225 4.625 21.125 2.9 18.5
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Slovakia 4.25 5.4 5.85 3.5 6
Moldova 3.75 10.575 11.15 14.75 12.25
Albania 5.575 1.575 4.575 4.25 3
Iceland 3.1 5.75 6.175 1.65 2.75
Hungary 7.95 3.475 2.9 4.25 3.5
FYR Macedonia 3.175 4.2 5.125 3.5 6
Finland 11.14 1.73 2.03 8 9
Republic of Ireland 2.15 2.59 5.815 1.75 7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.5 3.175 4.05 3.75 4.25
Latvia 5.35 1.075 1.975 1.75 1.125
Estonia 4.2 3.5 1.3 1.25 3.5
Lithuania 3.9 4.925 5.825 2 4.25
Montenegro 3.375 2.475 3.3 2.5 3
Georgia 4.875 5.875 1.525 1 0.95
Armenia 3.55 1.325 2.525 2.5 1.05
Malta 1.591 4.466 2.8 3.25 4.25
Luxembourg 2.575 5.05 4.975 3.5 6.25
Northern Ireland 2.475 3.4 3.65 3 2.25
Wales 5.575 5.2 5.775 5 6
Faroe Islands 1.45 1.975 2.95 3 1.5
Gibraltar 0.55 1.7 1.5 2.75 4.25
Andorra 2.666 2.699 2.733 2.75 4
San Marino 0.349 1.316 1.566 1.75 0.75
Kosovo — — 0 0 0.5
Liechtenstein does not organise a domestic league.
The Albanian champion was excluded from participating in the 2016/17 European competitions due to match-fixing. The
table contains the UEFA club coefficient of the runner-up FK Partizani as it played in the Champions League qualification.
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Table A.3: The strengths of the champions in the last five seasons
Association 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20
Turkey 1634 1658 1693 1648 1588
Austria 1613 1639 1704 1714 1775
Switzerland 1679 1710 1634 1651 1669
Czech Republic 1638 1592 1539 1585 1652
Netherlands 1662 1735 1618 1677 1843
Greece 1666 1695 1661 1627 1641
Croatia 1586 1665 1592 1573 1682
Denmark 1529 1596 1591 1534 1582
Israel 1527 1525 1563 1480 1501
Cyprus 1515 1492 1608 1605 1607
Romania 1519 1502 1426 1470 1558
Poland 1459 1492 1483 1394 1385
Sweden 1550 1489 1489 1517 1495
Azerbaijan 1465 1507 1512 1494 1472
Bulgaria 1446 1479 1523 1536 1516
Serbia 1443 1290 1519 1500 1545
Scotland 1557 1554 1612 1550 1600
Belarus 1552 1483 1449 1496 1489
Kazakhstan 1395 1441 1430 1486 1508
Norway 1458 1512 1528 1543 1513
Slovenia 1446 1297 1484 1302 1443
Liechtenstein — — — — —
Slovakia 1366 1342 1344 1403 1370
Moldova 1224 1324 1318 1333 1298
Albania 1227 1191 1272 1243 1148
Iceland 1234 1230 1227 1160 1147
Hungary 1325 1383 1309 1436 1468
FYR Macedonia 1151 1194 1340 1326 1229
Finland 1257 1191 1193 1217 1213
Republic of Ireland 1153 1242 1273 1198 1222
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1297 1185 1191 1190 1263
Latvia 1200 1127 1114 1130 1207
Estonia 1128 1001 972 953 1077
Lithuania 1129 1106 1185 1272 1291
Montenegro 1136 1148 1146 1085 1074
Georgia 1220 1186 1179 1209 1217
Armenia 1070 1006 995 1054 1134
Malta 935 1022 1013 1039 1069
Luxembourg 996 1038 1098 1257 1259
Northern Ireland 1032 1033 1034 1010 1069
Wales 1009 1030 1041 1017 1042
Faroe Islands 865 848 1008 1007 909
Gibraltar 881 947 942 900 915
Andorra 789 778 770 766 776
San Marino 697 693 684 699 679
Kosovo — — 1041 1102 1040
The teams’ strength is measured by Club Elo on 1 September of the given season, available at http://clubelo.com/Data.
The domestic leagues of the associations written in bold are taken in the calculation of Club Elo into account.
Liechtenstein does not organise a domestic league.
The Albanian champion was excluded from participating in the 2016/17 European competitions due to match-fixing. The
table contains the UEFA club coefficient of the runner-up FK Partizani as it played in the Champions League qualification.
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